Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE
Curriculum
C-350·Cross-platform·40 min

The cluster handed over its secrets Start this lab

A pod read every secret in its namespace through the cluster API using its own service account token. Name the service account that was used, decide a verdict on the workload, and rotate the secrets it read while leaving the logging agent that legitimately lists them alone.

Mission brief · C-350

Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench

Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default

You are acting as

the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity

How you got here

The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.

Your access

  • EDR console (detections + live response)

    Endpoint detection & response

    • Read the detection and process tree
    • Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
    • Open a live-response session on the host
    • Contain the host over the agent channel
    • Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
    • Not yours: Delete evidence
  • Live-response shell on the affected host

    Host shell session

    • Read the filesystem, logs and running state
    • Collect a triage package
    • Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval

What's at stake

The affected host

Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record

Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.

Rules of engagement

You may act alone

  • Investigate from the live-response session
  • Collect evidence and triage packages
  • Contain a standard-criticality host

Ask a human first

  • Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
  • Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider

Why this matters

Cluster workloads carry their own identity, and a token with more rights than the workload needs turns one compromised pod into every secret in the namespace.

Concepts

The token is the account

Audit records name the service account, not the container. That name is what you investigate and what you scope the blast radius by.

Read is disclosure

Nothing was changed, yet every secret it listed is now burned and has to be rotated.

Some workloads list objects legitimately

Logging and policy agents enumerate namespaces by design; the schedule and the object types tell them apart.

Objectives graded

  • Name the service account whose token read the secrets
  • Decide a verdict on the workload against what it is meant to do
  • Rotate every secret the read exposed behind an approval gate

Live walkthrough

The reference response, executed by the same engine that grades your attempt. Yours will differ — the rubric reads end state and evidence, not the shape of your workflow.

  1. 1.Approve consequential actionpromptapproval gateApprove consequential action
  2. 2.Write case field credentialRefactioncredentialRef → vault/soc-automation
  3. 3.Attach evidence: case/soar-c-350/evidenceactionThe learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  4. 4.Write case field closureNoteactionclosureNote → written
  5. 5.Write case field serviceAccountactionserviceAccount → svc-report-runner
  6. 6.verdict on ind-cluster-tokenactionind-cluster-token.verdict → malicious
  7. 7.secretsRotated on hst-nw-k8s01actionhst-nw-k8s01.secretsRotated → true

Gate approved — 100%

12 of 12 rubric rules hold.

Gate denied — 91%

Refusing the consequential action is a defensible choice with a measured cost; the difference is what the lab is teaching.

  • pass behavior · The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.
  • pass safety · A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.
  • pass efficiency · No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.
  • pass configuration · Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.
  • pass investigation · The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.
  • pass explanation · The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.
  • pass behavior · No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.
  • pass configuration · The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.
  • pass investigation · Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.
  • pass investigation · The learner named the service account whose token made the read.
  • pass investigation · The token use was judged against what that workload is meant to do.
  • pass behavior · The secrets the read exposed were rotated behind the approval gate.

MITRE ATT&CK coverage

A workload token used against the cluster API to list every secret in the namespace.

TechniqueNameTactic
T1552.007Unsecured Credentials: Container APICredential Access
T1078.004Valid Accounts: Cloud AccountsDefense Evasion
T1613Container and Resource DiscoveryDiscovery

What each rubric rule proves

  • The workflow reached a terminal success state on the graded run.

    behavior · weight 20

  • A consequential action passed through a human approval gate.

    safety · weight 15

  • No non-idempotent operation was retried without an idempotency key.

    efficiency · weight 10

  • Every action node resolves its secret from the vault, never an inline field.

    configuration · weight 10

  • The learner attached at least one linkable piece of evidence to the case.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The case carries an analyst closure note explaining the outcome.

    explanation · weight 10

  • No innocent asset in the alert batch was contained, disabled or revoked.

    behavior · weight 15

  • The playbook survived the integration faults it met and still finished.

    configuration · weight 15

  • Nothing was changed in the estate before evidence had been gathered.

    investigation · weight 10

  • The learner named the service account whose token made the read.

    investigation · weight 20 · T1613 Container and Resource Discovery (Discovery)

  • The token use was judged against what that workload is meant to do.

    investigation · weight 15 · T1552.007 Unsecured Credentials: Container API (Credential Access)

  • The secrets the read exposed were rotated behind the approval gate.

    behavior · weight 20 · T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts (Defense Evasion)

Common mistakes

  • Deleting the pod and treating the incident as over while the secrets stay in place.
  • Rotating secrets without restarting the workloads that hold the old ones, causing an outage you did not plan.

Same idea, three vendors

Vocabulary is generated from the teaching profiles, so it always matches what the consoles render.

ConceptCortex ForgeSummit SOARStoryline
caseIncidentContainerCase
alertAlertEventEvent
artifactIndicatorArtifactRecord
workflowPlaybookPlaybookStory
workflow-runPlaybook runPlaybook debug runStory run
nodeTaskBlockAction
connectorIntegrationAppCredential-backed action
connector-instanceIntegration instanceAssetResource
credentialCredentialAsset credentialCredential
approvalManual taskPromptPage
child-workflowSub-playbookChild playbookSub-story
context-pathContext pathDatapathEvent path
queueIncidentsEventsCases
taskWork Plan taskTaskCase task
noteWar Room entryNoteCase note

Where does this value come from?

The same reference to an enrichment node's verdict, written three ways:

  • Cortex Forge: ${enrich-sender.verdict}
  • Summit SOAR: enrich-sender.verdict
  • Storyline: <<enrich-sender.verdict>>

The same concepts in shipping products

The consoles you practice in use teaching names. These are the words the real vendors print in their own documentation, so the vocabulary survives the day you sit in front of a production tenant.

ConceptCortex XSOARXSOAR 8.xSplunk SOARSplunk SOAR 6.x (formerly Phantom)TinesTines (2026 cloud)Microsoft Sentinel + Logic AppsSentinel (Defender portal, 2026)Google SecOps SOARSecOps SOAR (formerly Siemplify)Swimlane TurbineTurbine (2026)Torq HyperautomationTorq (2026)IBM QRadar SOARQRadar SOAR (Resilient) 51.xServiceNow Security OperationsSecOps (Flow Designer era)
caseIncidentContainerCaseIncidentCaseRecordCaseIncidentSecurity incident (SIR)
alertAlertEventEventAlertAlertInbound record / signalTrigger eventEscalated offense / alertSecurity alert
artifactIndicatorArtifact (CEF fields)Event payload fieldEntityEntityField / correlation valueEvent fieldArtifactObservable
workflowPlaybookPlaybookStoryPlaybook (Logic App)PlaybookPlaybookWorkflowWorkflow (BPMN)Flow / subflow
workflow-runPlaybook runPlaybook run / debug runEvent flowLogic App runPlaybook executionPlaybook executionExecutionWorkflow executionFlow execution
nodeTaskBlockActionAction / stepAction / stepActionStepFunction / scriptFlow action
connectorIntegrationAppHTTP Request action / ToolConnectorIntegrationIntegrationIntegrationAppSpoke
connector-instanceIntegration instanceAssetCredential + resource pairAPI connectionIntegration instance (environment-scoped)AssetIntegration connectionApp configuration (app.config)Connection & credential alias
credentialCredentialAsset configuration secretCredentialManaged identity / connection secretIntegration parameter (secret)Vault secretSecretApp host secretCredential record
approvalManual (data collection) taskPrompt blockPage (form) / Send to ChatApproval action (Teams / email)Manual actionTask / approval actionApproval step (Torq Chat / Slack)Manual task / phase gateApproval activity
child-workflowSub-playbookChild playbookSend to StoryNested Logic AppBlockSub-playbookNested workflowCalled workflowSubflow
context-pathContext path (${...})DatapathFormula (<<path.to.value>>)Expression (@{body('step')})Placeholder ([Entity.Identifier])Reference ($record.field)Expression ({{ .event.field }})Rule/script object (incident.properties)Data pill
queueIncidents viewEvent / Case listCasesIncidents gridCases queueApplication workspaceCasesIncident listSIR queue
taskWork Plan taskTask (workbook phase)Case taskIncident taskTaskTaskCase taskTask (within phase)Response task
noteWar Room entryNoteCase noteCommentCase wall commentCommentCase commentNoteWork note

What transfers

The same reasoning applies to cloud instance metadata, CI runner tokens and any workload identity with namespace-wide read.