Cybrary ForgeCYBRARY / FORGE

Mission brief · C-366

Tier 3 analyst on the incident response bench

Tier 3 — deep host and forensics
Business important
Track default

You are acting as

the break-glass IR account `svc-ir`, checked out of the vault for this incident — never the compromised identity

How you got here

The detection fired in the EDR console. You opened a live-response session from that detection, so your shell rides the EDR agent channel — containing the host will *not* cut you off, which is exactly why you contain from here rather than over SSH.

Your access

  • EDR console (detections + live response)

    Endpoint detection & response

    • Read the detection and process tree
    • Look up host criticality, owner and VIP flags
    • Open a live-response session on the host
    • Contain the host over the agent channel
    • Not yours: Disable user accounts (that's the identity team)
    • Not yours: Delete evidence
  • Live-response shell on the affected host

    Host shell session

    • Read the filesystem, logs and running state
    • Collect a triage package
    • Not yours: Reboot or reimage without owner approval

What's at stake

The affected host

Owner: The system's business owner, named on the asset record

Containing a host you haven't identified can stop revenue. Check criticality and owner before you isolate anything.

Rules of engagement

You may act alone

  • Investigate from the live-response session
  • Collect evidence and triage packages
  • Contain a standard-criticality host

Ask a human first

  • Containing a mission-critical host — asset owner and on-call manager first
  • Disabling a user identity — identity team, and HR/legal if it looks like an insider

How much help do you want?

Objectives stay open and every step explains why it matters before it tells you what to run. Hints are free.

Graded case walkthrough

Open a lab as a live case and advance it one node at a time. The score beside each step is the lab rubric re-evaluated against what the engine actually did.

Files on a production share were overwritten and deleted rather than encrypted, so there is no note and nothing to pay for. Establish the tool and the scope, judge it against the retention job that deletes expired files, and get the share back from a recovery point.

Incident timeline

Relative to the moment the alert fired. One of these beats is ordinary activity.

  1. −25mAn admin account signs in to the file server out of hoursIdentityT1078.002
  2. −20mA secure-delete utility is dropped into a temporary folderEDRT1105
  3. −12mThe retention job deletes its usual batch of expired filesSIEMordinary activity
  4. alertThousands of files are overwritten then removed from one shareEDRT1485
  5. +14mShadow copies on the server are removed as wellEDRT1490