The Tool Said So
The injection is not in the prompt or the corpus. It comes back in the response from an integration the agent trusts. Find where the agent stopped treating tool output as data, and make it stop obeying its own tools.
Advanced · Several moving parts — expect trade-offs and a wrong turn or two.
Outcome · Detect and contain malicious instructions returned inside a tool response.
AI connection
This activity runs entirely on the deterministic runtime. Optional live-model runtimes only affect dialog, coaching and wording — never checks or scoring.
Nothing leaves the browser session.
Prompts never leave the learner's machine.
Lab prompts reach the learner's chosen provider only.
Customer tenancy; Cybrary sees metadata only.
Cybrary AI gateway; retention off by default.
Per-job — the router never sends restricted jobs off-tenant.
Lab manifest
The machine-readable release contract. Authors edit this; the console refuses to publish without checks, both regression suites and a reference solve.
schemaVersion: cybrary.ai-lab/v1
id: the-tool-said-so
release: 1.0.0
mode: ai-range
maturity: 3
roles:
- ai-security-engineer
- soc-analyst
outcomes:
niceTasks:
- T0258
atlasTechniques:
- AML.T0051
- AML.T0051.001
owaspRisks:
- LLM01
- LLM05
aiAssets:
models:
- support-agent-model@2026.06
prompts:
- the-tool-said-so-system-prompt@1
agents:
- support-agent-orchestrator@3
tools:
- crm.lookup
- ticket.update
- email.send
- refund.issue
corpora:
- support-kb@v4
enterpriseTopology: support-enterprise-v3
scenario:
seed: the-tool-said-so-seed-1
injects:
- the-tool-said-so-inject-1
telemetry:
requiredSignals:
- ai.trace
- rag.retrieval
- tool.call
- identity.auth
- dlp.egress
- siem.alert
evaluation:
deterministicChecks:
- the-tool-said-so-checks
repeatedTrials: 20
maliciousSuite: the-tool-said-so-attack-v1
benignSuite: support-utility-v4
safety:
networkEgress: deny
maxTokens: 250000
maxCostUsd: 20